Astrology, its legitimacy, and the limits of its acceptable practice were debated in sixteenthand seventeenth-century Europe. Many of the related arguments were mediated by the work of Giovanni Pico della Mirandola and the responses to it. Acknowledging the complexities of the relationship between astrological ideas and Christian teachings, this paper focuses on the Catholic debates by specifically considering the decisions about astrology taken by the Spanish Inquisition. The trials of astrologers are examined with the aim of understanding the role of experts in astrology in early modern Spain. This study brings into view the specific nature of the debate on astrology in Spain, the consequences of the actions of the Inquisition and the social control it exerted. The historical events discussed comprise a particular case and also mirror the general debates about astrology taking place in early modern Europe. The experts' opinions expressed in trials and in reports about the discipline received by the Inquisition reveal two key traits of the debate: the dispute about who had the authority to decide on the legitimacy of astrology and the disagreement about what constituted natural and judicial astrological practices. These led to different opinions about what was to be done with each defendant and about what content in their books ought to be forbidden.
Introduction
The study of the role of experts in early modern inquisitorial and legal trials has proved fruitful in many ways. It has highlighted, for example, the intellectual tools physicians used to establish their authority, illuminated how the concept of illness was negotiated, inquisitorial trials. 3 This debate is evident not only in the documents related to the preparation of the catalogues of prohibited and expurgated books, as has previously been said, but also in the inquisitorial trial records.
During the time of the inquisitorial trials, a debate developed concerning who was entitled to make decisions about the nature of astrology and about whether or not the practice of astrology should be permitted. Within a trial, the opposing sides would discuss the experience and background necessary to qualify a scholar as an expert, or authority, in the subject. The arguments between the critics and the defenders of astrology reveal telling aspects of the early modern debates surrounding the practice of astrology. The particular nature of the Spanish Inquisition, an institution not just of theological but also of social control active in the different kingdoms of the Spanish Monarchy, 4 determined the way the broader discussion on the practice of astrology evolved in Spain.
This study considers how debates surrounding inquisitorial trials, though evolving in a specific context, often mirrored the general debates about astrology taking place in sixteenth-and seventeenth-century Europe. 5 The arguments used in defense of astrology 6. The Black Legend is defined as the stereotypical depiction of early modern Spain as ignorant, fanatical, and backward, particularly in science. For a study of the origins and history of the term, see Víctor Navarro Brotons , 2006) . 7. The so-called 'polemic of Spanish science' was a debate about the existence of scientific activity in Spain in the seventeenth century (and later on) and about the (lack of) a national contribution to the Scientific Revolution, initiated at the end of the eighteenth century, which continued until the second half of the twentieth century. This debate was tainted by ideological, nationalistic, and religious positions. "A sterile and meaningless debate" are the words and those used to criticize it in the context of the Spanish Inquisition's courts share features with the arguments used in other European contexts. The aim of this article is to focus on the debates on expertise and authority as they developed in early modern Spain as a specific aspect of scientific activity. It does so while refusing to frame the historical questions that arise in the study within some historiographical constructions that have often been used in studies of science in Spain, such as Spain's role in the Scientific Revolution, or that have reduced the relationship between science and religion in early modern Spain to the issue of science versus the Spanish Inquisition or of science versus magic and astrology. This article assumes that, historiographically, we are beyond interpreting early modern Spanish science through the misleading lens of the Black or the Green legends, as well as beyond interpreting early modern science according to the aforementioned confrontations.
Beyond the old frameworks
In the decade after Víctor Navarro Brotons and William Eamon questioned the so-called Black Legend, and with it the customary place of Iberian science in the Scientific Revolution, these two authors insisted on the need for new questions and perspectives. 6 A few things are now clear. Endlessly rehashing the polemic of Spanish science and the presence or absence of elements of the new science in Spain resulted in "a sterile and meaningless debate" with little relevance to current historiography, some of which questions the very concept of the Scientific Revolution. 7 These debates were abandoned long One of the essential elements which could help overcome lingering traces of the polemic of Spanish science in the general historiography is explaining the influence of the Inquisition on scientific activity in Iberian, and more specifically Spanish, territories. 11 In his seminal work on science and censorship, José Pardo-Tomás questioned whether the sterile, old polemic had inhibited specialists and contributed to the scarcity of rigorous studies on the relationship between science and the Inquisition in Spain. 12 Yet, even setting aside that polemic -as Pardo-Tomás did when considering the debate about Inquisition and science -has not changed the situation much. 13 Studies on the Inquisition often rely on a superficial reading of the Indexes of Prohibited Books when dealing with the censorship of scientific works, especially astrological works. Pardo-Tomás' work remains the only one that undertakes a systematic study of the documents related to censorship of scientific works in Spain and seeks to understand the typology of the censorship, the way the Indexes were prepared, the circumstances surrounding each case, as well as the efficiency and efficacy of those prohibitions or expurgations. 14 Historical studies of science and the Spanish Inquisition seem to consistently struggle to overcome misleading assumptions about the relationship between Spanish science and the Inquisition in a manner reminiscent of the traditional idea of conflict between science and religion. The historiographical defeat of the polemic of Spanish science parallels the efforts made by historians of science to go beyond the traditional idea of conflict between science and religion and the so-called conflict thesis or warfare thesis. 15 David Lindberg and Ronald Numbers have shown on several occasions that the interactions between Christianity and science were complex and not reducible to simple conflict. 16 The studies on the Inquisition and its relationship with intellectual activity can be placed in the context of both efforts. Many historians have pointed out how methodologically and historically inaccurate -if not absurd -it is to try to use those old paradigms to understand and interpret either science in the Iberian world during the seventeenth century or the confrontations of natural philosophers with the Church in the early modern period.
Once liberated from intellectual constructions which invented the dichotomies of science in opposition to religion or science in opposition to magic, 17 new historical works on the early modern study of nature have been enriched by considering many other elements, including astrology. 18 Studies on the role of astrology in early modern science and medicine have increased in the past decade. 19 done on the subject that takes into consideration a variety of social, political, religious, and scientific contexts. The only way to really go beyond misleading, ideologically directed interpretations (Black or Green) is to focus on the actual scientific activity during that period. 20 The present study is situated along this historiographical line.
Authority in astrology
All over Europe, but with differing results in a variety of works, sixteenth-century scholars interested in astrology echoed a similar theme: the need for a new, revised, reformed astrology. They furthermore expressed their opinions about the precise way the revision must be carried out. Astronomers, philosophers, theologians, physicians, and astrologers all discussed the subject, determining the parts of astrology that were acceptable and respected human free will and the divine power from those parts that contradicted them. The debate about the legitimacy of astrology characteristic of the second half of the sixteenth century was particularly acute in Spain. The Spanish Inquisition prosecuted practitioners of astrology and forbade books on the subject following the guidelines that emerged from the Council of Trent. In particular, there was a debate about who were the correct type of experts who could be called upon to issue opinions on the discipline of astrology. Arguments about astrology and astrological experts can be found in a certain type of reports, called memoriales, which were sent to the Inquisition. Beginning in 1583, these reports were requested by the Inquisition for the preparations of the rules that would serve as guidelines for the publication of the Indexes of prohibited and expurgated books. Pardo-Tomás noted that the debate about experts in astrology was provoked by the institution itself when it undertook these broad enquiries. 21 Despite it being quite clear that those consultations provoked a debate in the reports, it was not actually a new debate. Rather, I argue that this was in fact a much older debate which began in the sixteenth century with the Spanish scholar Pedro Sánchez Ciruelo (ca. 1470-ca. 1548).
Ciruelo was a respected member of the Spanish scholarly community whose works were focused on the mathematical disciplines and on theology. He studied at the University of Salamanca for ten years, focusing on mathematics, astronomy, and astrology. He then travelled to Paris, where he studied theology while he taught mathematics and astrology, and where there had been other members of the group of the Spanish calculatores -originators of the development of mathematical physics in Spanish universities -among them, Juan Martínez Silíceo and Fernán Pérez de Oliva. 22 The breadth of his interests is attested by his editions of Thomas Bradwardine's Aritmetica Speculativa and Geometria Speculativa, a Commentary to the Sphaera of Sacrobosco, a Cursus mathematicarum, several works on logic, his Apotelestmata Astrologiae Christianae in defense of astrology, and a vernacular work on the plague. A work on the conjunction of 1524 is also attributed to him. He added to this later works on Petrus Hispanus' Summulae and a Confesionario, sermons, epistles, and the famous and many times reprinted Reprobación de las supersticiones y hechicerías. 23 Ciruelo's early works in defense of astrology and his discussion of expertise were part of the disputes about astrology which took place all over Europe at the end of the fifteenth century. While Ciruelo wrote his main work on the subject in the 1520s, the arguments used in the later memoriales inquisitorial reports and also in later trials of practitioners of astrology would echo many of his arguments about who should judge astrological practices and ideas. In what follows, I will describe the position of Pedro Ciruelo on the subject in his work of 1521, consider two reports of 1584 and 1622, and reflect on the participation of experts in trials from 1611 through to the 1690s. These considerations will roughly define the chronological span of the article.
The debate about authority in astrology was already present in works printed at the beginning of the sixteenth century. These works are situated in the context of the responses of scholars to the attack on astrology initiated by the publication of Giovanni Ciruelo explicitly organized the Apotelesmata into four books which followed Ptolemy's Tetrabiblos (Latin Quadripartitum), the major treatise that laid down astrology's central categories and relations. In the context of the debates about astrology in sixteenth-century Europe, this format signaled a clear stance. It aligned Ciruelo with the opinion of those who based their defense of astrology on the idea that what was once a valid, pristine discipline -as it appeared in Ptolemy's work -had been corrupted by later medieval, particularly Arab, additions which must be purged in order to restore the true astrology. He considered the astrological practices of interrogations and elections to be Arabic additions, although he defended that there were some elections belonging to natural astrology which were acceptable practices. 27 Ciruelo had already advanced the idea of the need to reform astrology and return to the Ptolemaic one in a work published twenty years before the Apotelesmata, a commentary to Sacrobosco's Sphere. 29 In this work, he argued that Ptolemy's astrology in the Quadripartitum (and in the Centiloquium), which he still considered genuinely Ptolemaic, was the astrology which must be seen as pure, having not been mixed with false superstitions. 30 He explained that later additions had mixed in falsehoods, particularly those of the Persian astrologer Albumasar and his theory of conjunctions, the Arab astrologer of the tenth-eleventh centuries Abenragel, and the thirteenth-century Italian astrologer Guido Bonati. 31 (2002): 437-59. 34. "La verdadera astrología habla de cosas que se causan por las virtudes de los cielos, que con sus movimientos y luces alteran el ayre y la mar, y la tierra, y assí causan diversos effetos de tiempos …, y porque los cielos y las estrellas alterando el ayre y la tierra también alteran a los hombres …, assí los cielos causan a nuestros cuerpos diversas calidades, complexiones, passiones y enfermedades, diversas inclinaciones y abilidades …. Y en estos juicios no hay vanidad ni superstición alguna, porque aplica a los effectos sus causas que tienen virtud natural para los hazer …, y esta astrología es lícita y verdadera sciencia como filosofía natural, o la medicina … La falsa astrología no es arte ni sciencia verdadera, antes es una superstición, porque de los cielos y estrellas presumen de juzgar de cosas que ellas no pueden ser causas dellas …, las cosas de acaescimientos por diversos casos de fortuna … y los secretos del coraçón y voluntad del hombre … [que es] libre" (Ciruelo, Reprobación, fols. 16v-17r). 35. These -good, true, licit versus bad, false, illicit -are the terms used in early modern texts, so all of them are categories of the historical actors. to Ptolemy and an elimination of medieval Arab ideas and of some other astrological contents (like Bonati's ideas), as the general foundation of his main work in defense of astrology. As has often been pointed out, even the idea of a reformed astrology was based on the traditional distinction between a true astrology and a false, superstitious, intolerable one. 32 This article aims to show that the idea that there existed a true astrology (related to what was broadly defined as natural astrology), and that there was another set of astrological practices that were wrong (classified as judicial astrology) and that was different from that true astrology, became a theme in inquisitorial trials during the following century, similarly to how they had been rehearsed in the aforementioned reports.
In his popular work of 1537 titled Reprobación de supersticiones y hechicerías (Reprobation of superstitions and sorceries), Ciruelo defined at length the two kinds of astrology and the difference between them. 33 True astrology, he explained, is that which is based on the natural effects caused by the stars on air and water, thus affecting the weather and human health, complexions, and inclinations. False astrology predicts things related to human free will and chance. 34 Establishing the difference between an astrology that was natural -and thus good, true, and licit -and one that was superstitious -and thus bad, false, and illicit -was not an early modern construction. 35 It had medieval antecedents, and could be found in the works of Roger Bacon and Albertus Magnus. 36 The same distinction was also applied to magic, and magic and astrology were on occasion linked, particularly when theologians tried to establish criteria for the condemnation of illicit practices related to divination. Early modern authors were well acquainted with the works of Marsilio Ficino and Tommaso Campanella, who also referred to the 37. On Renaissance authors differentiating "good" and "bad" magic, see D. P. difference between good and bad magic. 37 Ficino and Campanella were known and cited by Spanish authors like Ciruelo; however, they were not mentioned in the specific trials studied here.
One of the main themes highlighted by Ciruelo -writing long before the Inquisition started its consultations for the Indexes -was his concern that scholars were discussing astrology as if they all had the same knowledge of the subject. Ciruelo insisted in his Apotelesmata Astrologiae Christianae that it was first necessary to establish who had the authority to make decisions concerning the nature of astrology, who was an expert in it, and could judge whether or not it should be permitted. In his introductory letter, Ciruelo complained that only those who met the criteria of being purus theologus (pure theologians) should prevail when judging astrological works. 38 The term "pure theologian" was a category used by both astrologers and theologians involved in the polemic about astrology in Spain. It referred to scholars whose university studies and later works focused on theology, but who had not studied mathematics and astrology beyond the elementary quadrivium. His text indicates that from his point of view, as astrologers and theologians did not receive the same training, their opinions were not equally authoritative on this subject. 39 Ciruelo was not the only one to rely on this category. Later on, the authors of some of the reports (the memoriales) would use it in defense of astrology written for the Inquisition (see the following section).
Ciruelo's idea was that only a person who was both a theologian and an astrologer would be qualified to examine astrological dogma and pass judgment with certainty. 40 With little modesty, he explained that he considered himself "iudex aequus fidelis et incorruptus," that is, the perfect judge for determining what should be considered allowable Christian astrological doctrine, citing his training both as a theologian (at the university in Paris) and as an astrologer (at the University of Salamanca). 41 Indeed he was taken to be an authority, particularly after he published the aforementioned work in the 1530s, Reprobaciones. This work was addressed to "both secular and religious judges, whose negligence and carelessness" had led, according to him, to the spread of witchcraft and 42. "Esta es una doctrina muy verdadera y cathólica sacada de las entrañas de la más sana theología, que disputa contra los errores de las supersticiones y hechicerías que en estos tiempos andan muy públicos en nuestra España, por la negligencia de los señores prelados y de todos los otros juezes, ansí eclesiásticos como seglares" (Ciruelo, Reprobación, 1r). 43. "Tercero capítulo: arguye contra la falsa astrología poniendo differencia entre ella y la otra que es buena sciencia" (Ciruelo, Reprobación, " Mendoza's memorial was one of the reports sent to the Inquisition regarding the Index of Expurgated Books of 1584. It features the same confrontation between theologians and astrologers about who was an authority regarding astrology. In this later debate, the dispute was about whether "pure theologians" could have a sufficient knowledge to effectively determine what exactly within astrology should be forbidden. This doubt about whether having theological competence was enough was stated by Mendoza, a supporter of astrology. He begged those responsible for the wording of the rule in the Index to "consult not with pure theologians, because there will be a need for consulting wise astrologers… because to judge about the truth or falseness of the other sciences, one must argue departing from the principles of each one of the sciences." 45 Mendoza is undoubtedly using the category "pure theologian" in the same sense as Ciruelo had several decades before. An advisor or consultant of the Inquisition writing in the margins of Mendoza's memorial asserted irately: "To judge what is licit only belongs to theologians, and to pure theologians, because there are no rules about what is licit in astrology, but only in theology." 46 The category "pure theologian" was clearly well understood; all the historical actors knew what was meant by it. The Inquisition's statute established that advisors had to be theologians, and the one in charge of evaluating Mendoza's report was certain that his authority was being challenged. 47 
Experts in the trials
The term "expert" had different meanings in early modern societies. It was used to refer to a person with experience in a particular discipline or activity. 50 An expert was also one who had knowledge of a craft or profession which came from practice. 51 Several scholars have insisted that often, in early modern settings, expertise was assessed on the basis of practical skills rather than academic credentials. 52 The sources on which this study is based, however, often used the term "expert" (experto) and related terms (see the following paragraphs) to describe individuals with theoretical knowledge and individuals who had practical experiential knowledge. Despite the emphasis put on practical experience to define an expert, as several studies have shown, it must not be forgotten that apart from practical or technical knowledge, early modern expertise could be defined as control over a body of knowledge, that is, theoretical, erudite knowledge. 53 It was not unusual for professors of astrology at universities to be required to publish annual 54. See Tayra M. C. Lanuza Navarro, Astrología, ciencia y sociedad en la España de los Austrias, PhD dissertation, Universitat de València, 2005, pp.110-53. 55 . From the Latin qualificare, meaning to judge, define, describe.
prognostications, as was the case in Spanish universities. 54 Thus, the theoretical knowledge of these expertos could also be coupled with practical astrological skills.
As the description of the sources that follow show, these "experts" were called expertos, peritos, or sabios (expert, skilled, wise) in the trials as well as other inquisitorial documents. Perito is a term with an empirical implication, thus charged with the meaning of someone with practical experience. The connotations of the term sabio, however, are of theoretical knowledge of the bookish kind resulting from regular early modern university training. Both kinds of experts -with practical experience and with theoretical knowledge -were consulted. The sources very often refer to the people called forth to act as experts with the specifically inquisitorial term calificadores. A calificador was the person appointed by the Inquisition to evaluate books and declarations and decide about their legitimacy. 55 The Inquisition consulted astrological experts on several instances. First, in trials, the experts were to assess the activities of the person accused and to explain if those activities were forbidden astrological practices. Second, they were to evaluate the books and documents belonging to those being prosecuted. These were usually collected and confiscated when people were arrested by inquisitorial officers. Third, experts were asked to send a report to the Inquisition about the contents of the confiscated printed works. Their reports would recommend whether the work should be withdrawn from circulation, included in the Index of Prohibited Books, or added to the list of works to be expurgated (permitted only after the passages referring to forbidden astrology had been eliminated). The same kinds of experts, now acting as calificadores, made reports specifying the parts of the book to be crossed out. And finally, the Inquisition asked the opinion of experts in the preparation of the rules included at the beginning of the catalogues of prohibited books. These rules, which appeared at the beginning of each edition of the Index, established what kind of astrology was forbidden. In all cases, the way these experts expressed their opinions about the subject tells us much about the debate regarding astrology in this inquisitorial context. Discussions were focused on two issues: the interpretation of the set of Church injunctions against astrology (mainly the papal Bull Coeli et Terrae and rule nine of the Spanish Index of Prohibited Books) and the expertise needed to decide about the prosecution of astrological practitioners.
The contents of both the Bull and the rule of the Spanish Inquisition are widely known to historians. Pope Sixtus V, in Coeli et Terrae, condemned all forms of divination. Such foreknowledge was reserved only for God. Those who claimed to have attained it were using demonic knowledge. When classified this way, astrology, along with other divinatory practices, was considered "a vain and false art" (supradictas damnatas, vanas, fallaces et perniciosas divinandi artes). The Bull, however, exempted natural astrological predictions: those "related to agriculture and meteorology, medicine and navigation." It explicitly forbade judicial astrological predictions: those "about contingent future events, or actions that depend on man's free will, even if they claim that they are not predicting anything as certain. against magic and divination initially coincided with the Bull in its general ban of astrology. It then went on to describe more specific prohibitions related to astrology, emphasizing the idea of man's free will and referring to nativities, interrogations, and elections as forbidden practices. However, the rule also included a clarification about what parts of astrology were to be allowed. This measure resulted in exceptions, which opened a wide and often fairly contradictory field for interpretation:
But we do not forbid either the parts of astrology related to the knowledge of the weather and general events of the world, or those that teach how to know from the nativity of a person his inclinations, conditions and corporeal qualities. We do not forbid either the predictions that belong to agriculture, navigation and medicine or the [astrological] elections related to these natural things. 56
With this ruling, experts had an open field to debate which nativities and astrological elections entered into the category laid down by the rule. Let us now consider some examples of prosecutions involving these rules. The trials under consideration come from different periods and different courts. They span the period from the beginning to the end of the seventeenth century. As historians of the Inquisition have pointed out, the institution changed dramatically between its founding in 1478 and its dissolution in the nineteenth century. The general context for each case, as also for each local tribunal, was different: different types of victims predominated at different times; different concerns predominated in different courts; and the monarchy's political power fluctuated. 57 But between the publication of the Index of 1583 and the end of the seventeenth century, the rules regarding astrology remained constant. The arguments that were employed in the trials regarding who should be considered an authority in astrology were similar to Pedro Sánchez Ciruelo's arguments, as well as to those found in the reports on astrology sent to the Inquisition. These similarities allow for a better understanding of how experts behaved in the various trials and their role in the general debate about astrology itself.
The first case to be considered is the trial of Jerónimo Oller, prosecuted by the court of Barcelona in 1611. Oller was a clergyman, a priest of the cathedral of Barcelona. 58 It is important to notice in this case the use of several terms to refer to expertos. The historical actors employed the terms expertos de astrología (experts of astrology) as well as muy práctico en astrología (well versed in astrology) during this trial. 59 Oller was accused of "making and printing prognostications and casting natal figures, making predictions based on interrogations, and he affirmed future and past secret things." During his trial, the Inquisition decided that three calificadores should examine a prognostication Oller had made for the year 1611. The experts recommended that copies of this text should be collected by the Inquisition to prevent its circulation. 60 It is worth emphasizing that at Oller's trial, one of the witnesses was consulted as an expert because he was considered "well versed in astrology." 61 This witness said that "using astrology it was not possible to get to know the things that Oller had predicted." 62 Among the papers Oller had at home, the inquisitors found "many books on interrogations and figures of nativities, and also [the book by] Albohazen Ali De Judiciis, which is a book disapproved by theologians." 63 He confessed that a portfolio with many natal figures had indeed been written by him, and that he possessed another book with many rules for astrological judgments that he had bought in Valencia. Several other astrologers were asked by the Inquisition to examine these documents and books belonging to the defendant. The conclusion of these experts was that "many things contained in Oller's documents could not be known using good astrology, and that some of his books were disapproved" (emphasis mine). 64 Thus, the experts in their testimonies insisted on the difference between "good astrology" and the divination practiced by the defendant. The latter activity was not a part of the "good art of astrology" but rather belonged to other kinds of practices. One of the main issues that emerge from these testimonies is the awareness of the experts that, in a certain sense, it was not just the defendant who was on trial, but the discipline itself. So, they were very careful to condemn the activities of Oller while simultaneously stressing that these were not acceptable to them as "well versed astrologers," 65 condemned. They were also simultaneously establishing their own authority on the subject by differentiating themselves from the accused astrologer, whom they wanted the Inquisition to perceive as a practitioner lacking the needed learning to practice "good" (that is, Catholic, licit) astrology.
In the two following cases, those of the physicians Isidro Gil and Francisco Martínez, who were prosecuted in Cuenca in the 1690s, the main theme emerging from the sources is disagreement. The experts disagreed about how to characterize the defendants' astrological activities. Their reports show that personal opinions and interpretations of the rules and of the Bull Coeli et Terrae could lead to different trial outcomes.
The physician Isidro Gil was accused of practicing forbidden astrology in Cuenca in 1692. 66 In this case, the experts consulted by the inquisitors disagreed about how Gil's astrological practice should be classified: whether as natural astrology, and thus licit, or as judicial astrology, and thus forbidden. Three experts were asked to judge the activities of Gil as they were described by witnesses, as well as his own response to the accusations. The first consultant, a Trinitarian friar, concluded that the defendant had not committed any crime with his practice of astrology. The two Franciscan friars who were also consulted dissented. They were certain that Gil had engaged in superstitious divination and said that, according to Sixtus V's Bull, he should be condemned by the Inquisition. Differing interpretations of the Bull could make a huge difference in the consultants' opinions. Because of these dissimilar opinions, the inquisitors decided to consult two more experts -in this case, two Dominican friars. They agreed with the Franciscans and asserted that Gil's activities should be classified as judicial astrology, not natural astrology, and therefore were forbidden and subject to prosecution.
There was also a similar disagreement among the experts consulted in the case of the physician Francisco Martínez, also in the court of Cuenca in 1693. 67 Seven experts were asked their opinions about his practices. They all concurred that predicting the location of stolen items was a forbidden and superstitious practice, falling under the category of judicial astrology. However, when they had to judge the natal charts he had made, they disagreed. Four of them saw the practice as judicial and were sure that it was forbidden by the papal Bull. The other three concluded that, as they were figures constructed to "know about the outcome of an illness," it was an allowed practice. Astrological medicine was one of the parts of the discipline considered natural astrology, allowed indeed by the ninth rule as well as by Sixtus V's Bull. These cases again show that the difference between permitted and forbidden practices was not always clear. Some advisors of the Inquisition accepted natal charts when their objective was to predict the course of an illness. Other advisors accepted them more widely, also considering natal charts as natural astrology when their interpretation generally depended on humoral constitution influenced by the heavens, such as the personal complexion and temperament or a general account of the physical and moral characteristics of the person.
68. "Es todo de materia judiciaria, y aunque haya doctrinas muy buenas para la medicina que se pudieran permitir según la regla y la Bula de Sixto, todavía andan trabadas con la materia judiciaria en modo que quedan inficcionadas y reprobadas" (AHN Secc. Inq. . 69. "Si bien en dichos papeles incluso se contienen algunas observaciones más físicas que supersticiosas en orden a la agricultura, medicina y fisonomía, las quales no están prohibidas sueltas por sí solas, pero estando juntas con dichas prohibidas proposiciones no se debe reparar en que juntamente queden prohibidas, no siendo de provecho alguno común ni fáciles de separar, principalmente siendo en lo científico de la physica y astrología, más que doctrinas acertadas, delirios y sueños ridículos." Even if the use of the term "lo científico," the scientific, was not usual, it must be noted that this is not a unique case in Renaissance works. It must not be anachronistically interpreted as 'scientific' in the modern sense. The inquisitor is using "lo científico" to refer to medicine and natural astrology in contrast with 'the deliriums and ridiculous dreams' of what he considers superstitious practices. The term must, of
The trial of the Italian Giacomo Bramoselli in 1660 also featured this critical debate about what was natural and what was judicial astrology. This trial involved the examination of practices related to magic and superstition as well as fraud. The trial lasted from 1660 to 1663, with several declarations of the defendant. At a certain point a member of the Inquisition wrote a summary of Bramoselli's statements. His opinion was that everything Bramoselli said was "of judicial nature, and even if there are [in astrology] very good doctrines for medicine that could be allowed according to the rule and the Bull by Sixtus, they are still mixed with judicial things in a way that they become infected and condemned." 68 The opinion of the prosecutor reflects the difficulty that historical non-specialist agents in astrology found in discerning natural astrology from judicial practices, and shows the consequent position of some inquisitors before the discipline. The boundaries between 'useful' medical astrology, and superstitious, condemned astrology were too diffuse; all aspects of astrology mixed and became indiscernible.
Several experts, including two Jesuits, a Trinitarian, and a Franciscan, were asked not only as theologians, but also as astrological experts to examine Bramoselli's documents. The personal opinion of one of the Jesuit examiners, Baptista Dávila, was that the Inquisition should not worry about distinguishing between natural and judicial practices. Even if astrological medicine was acceptable, he considered that the effort needed to establish the distinction between natural medical astrology and judicial astrology in each case was not worth it. His advice to the Inquisition was to ignore the parts of astrology which could be useful for their medical interest, to not invest time and resources in trying to find out if it was natural or judiciary astrology that was contained in each written work under evaluation. His opinion was that every astrological activity should be condemned. Dávila's words read: Médicos, . "Algunos teólogos y juristas que, con buen celo, sin distinguir lo malo de lo bueno, condenan la judiciaria sólo porque con este nombre hay otras supersticiones, y condenan … lo que no han estudiado." 72. "De todo lo dicho se ve claramente, según la doctrina de santo Tomás, luz de la escuela teológica, que la astrología judiciaria en lo tocante a nacimientos no es mala, juzgando la figura como el mismo santo enseña, y según esto, ni tampoco es prohibida por el motu propio de Sixto V." So Dávila's idea was that the wrong part of astrology -that is, judicial prognostications -somehow corrupted what he called lo científico (the scientific aspects) of astrological medicine and natural astrology. His conclusion was that the easiest path for the Inquisition was to forbid it all. The defenders of the discipline argued that this was precisely the reason why astrologers alone, or perhaps together with theologians, should be consulted. Theologians, they argued, could not differentiate between natural astrological knowledge based on physical causes, and those based on divination; they simply condemned them all. It was the same problem Ciruelo had stated in the Apotelesmata Astrologiae Christianae going back to 1521.
Several reports by experts in astrology consulted by the Inquisition in later periods expressed the same concern. The Inquisition asked Fernando de Vera, the bishop of the city of Bujía, to write a report in 1622 because "he knows about this science and is a very good theologian and calificador." 70 Vera criticized the members of the Inquisition who had not studied astrology and still condemned it despite their lack of knowledge: "Without distinguishing right from wrong, some theologians and jurists condemn judicial astrology only because they think that the term implies superstition, and they condemn what they have not studied." 71 Fernando de Vera based his report in a defense of the discipline based on Thomas Aquinas. Following Aquinas, he considered that natal charts should not be considered illicit: "If the natal chart is interpreted the way Thomas Aquinas taught, then judicial astrology concerning nativities is not bad, therefore, it is not forbidden by Sixtus Vth motu propio." 72 The bishop was then echoing this same idea about authority in astrology: theologians and jurists did not know enough about astrology to offer an expert opinion. They could not discern what practices or ideas about genethlialogy (natal astrology) were licit and not included in Sixtus' prohibition, so they were not the right experts to be consulted. 
Conclusion
Debates about expertise and who possessed the requisite knowledge to be considered an authority on a discipline related to the study of nature constituted an interesting moment in early modern Europe. It was a period characterized by debates about the cognitive status of philosophy versus mathematics and by the calls of astronomers for their explanations to be perceived as true representations of the cosmos, and not dismissed as only computational devices. 73 In the case of astrology, expertise in the discipline meant knowledge of the different branches of astrology and of whether or not they could be accepted. The witnesses consulted in the trials, the experts called in as calificadores, and the testimonies regarding the defendants' activities given by those considered "well versed" in the discipline were valued by the inquisitors for the specific cases. But expertise in astrology also meant knowledge of a discipline under suspicion for a number of reasons. Therefore, the experts always tried to defend astrology as a legitimate discipline, hardly limiting themselves to only assessing the particular case they were being called upon to evaluate.
The participation of experts in the trials evolved into a discussion about who was qualified to judge books on astrology and astrological practices. The experts were concerned that if the verdict was left only to theologians who had no astrological knowledge, their ignorance of the differences between the branches of astrology could lead them to condemn it all. Thus, they discussed the ideal prerequisite training advisors and inquisitors should have, yet disagreed on what qualified someone as an expert.
The European debate about astrology during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries had specific traits in Spain because of decisions related to astrology made by the Spanish Inquisition. It developed around the pronouncements of the Inquisition regarding works on astrology, but also around the testimonies of experts in the trials. The personal attitudes and opinions of the inquisitors and the experts they consulted played a major role in the debates on astrology. The different inquisitors and experts never arrived at a consensus regarding the discipline or the aspects of it that should be allowed or forbidden. The debate about expertise was ultimately a debate about authority. Defenders of the discipline tried to argue that authority in evaluating the practice of astrology meant specific knowledge of it. Theologians argued that authority was legitimated by the superiority of theological knowledge, especially if the discussion concerned Christian doctrine and specific aspects of astrology that contradicted it. Thus, as in other instances, it was not just a question of who had the necessary knowledge to decide, but also a question of who had the power to make the decisions.
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